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A PRESCRIPTION FOR GENDER: How MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONALS CAN HELP SECURE EQUALITY FOR 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 
JENNIFER L. LEVI* 
INTRODUCTION 
Transgender people have made tremendous legal gains in the last several years. 
We live in a period of rapid social change, hopefully approaching a time when 
trans gender individuals and our families enjoy the same legal rights and 
privileges afforded to other members of society. However, we are not there yet. I 
This essay discusses the role medical professionals must play if transgender 
people are to achieve full humanity in light of legal developments in the areas of 
employment and family law. 2 
Medical professionals are at the heart of directing and implementing policies 
that have an enormous effect on the lives of transgender individuals. In a world of 
unpredictability for outcomes in cases involving trans gender litigants, medical 
professionals can be influential in securing advantageous outcomes. Medical and 
professional skills are critical to the transgender community, not only for the 
specific medical expertise physicians and others provide to their patients, their 
patients' families, employers, and communities, but also because of the direct 
role medical findings and testimony play in the courts. Through a concise review 
of the pertinent case law, I will articulate some of the ways in which medical 
professionals can also facilitate and enrich the lives of trans gender patients and 
clients by formulating and supporting definitions and determinations of gender 
that can then be applied in a legal context. 
Part I reviews cases involving discrimination against transgender people in 
* Jennifer L. Levi is an Assistant Professor at Western New England College School of Law. The 
author would like to thank the following people for assistance in the theorizing and editing of this piece: 
Sue Donnelly, Martha Ertman, Stephanie Gaynor, Shannon Minter, Paisley Currah, Liz Seaton, and 
Lindsey Straus. Thanks to Peter Basso for the title, and special thanks to Lisa Osiecki for invaluable 
research assistance. 
1. This article will primarily address the significant advances made in the areas of family and 
non-discrimination law. Despite these advances, trans gender people continue to be the victims of 
physical violence. See, e.g., Brandon ex rei. Estate ofBrandon v. County ofRichardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 
621 (Neb. 2001) (sheriff held liable for failing to protect Brandon Teena's life after he reported rape and 
threats against his life to authorities); Ellen Miller, Killer Agrees to Plea Bargain; Man Could Get up to 
48 Years for Beating Gay Navajo Teen, Rocky Mtn. News, Feb. 9, 2002, at IB (sixteen year old 
bludgeoned to death and his body left to rot because of his gender and sexual orientation); Bill Miller, 
D.C. Settles Bias Suit in 1995 Death; Rescue Workers Mistreated, Mocked Injured Transvestite, Wash. 
Post, Aug. 11,2000, at BOI (woman dies when paramedics make derogatory comments and discontinue 
treatment upon learning she is transgender). 
2. This essay is based, in part, on a keynote speech given by the author at the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association ("HBIGDA") on November 2, 2001 in Galveston, Texas. 
The author is on the legal committee for HBIGDA. 
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employment, credit, public accommodations, and housing. Part II addresses the 
state of family law as it has been applied to trans gender people. Part III concludes 
by suggesting ways medical professionals can play an instrumental role in 
achieving favorable outcomes for trans gender litigants, particularly in the area of 
family law. 
I. STATE AND FEDERAL NON-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Despite recent advances, transgender people have been historically excluded 
from the reach of federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex.3 
Non-discrimination laws in the United States have changed dramatically in the 
last fifty years, but with few exceptions, the laws of most jurisdictions still do not 
expressly protect transgender people against discrimination.4 With the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Act"),5 Congress not only outlawed discrimination 
on the basis of race, but prohibited discrimination based on sex, national origin, 
and religion as well.6 After the Act's passage, most states that had not already 
done so enacted laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, credit, 
housing, and public accommodations.7 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, transgender employees who encountered 
discrimination in the workplace began to bring claims under federal and state 
laws.8 While the facts varied, all arose when a trans gender person was fired, 
3. For articles analyzing the recent positive trend and the legal developments that fostered it see 
Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and 
Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 37 (Fall 2000); Jennifer L. 
Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 Wm. & Mary 
J. Women & L. 5 (Fall 2000); Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal 
Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 283 (1997); Katherine 
M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1995); and Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. I (1995). 
4. Minnesota, New Mexico, and Rhode Island have enacted discrimination laws that expressly include 
transgender people. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.01(45) (West WESTLAW through 2002 1st Spec. Sess.); 
N.M. Stat. Ann., § 28-1-2 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2002 2d Reg. Sess.); R.1. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2 
(2001), Protections for transgender people at the local level have been expanding by leaps and bounds. At 
the time of drafting this article, over 53 local jurisdictions have adopted trans gender-inclusive 
non-discrimination ordinances. See http://www.transgenderlaw.org!ndlawslchart.pdf; see also Paisley 
Currah & Shannon Minter, Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers (June 
2000) at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/tghandbook.htm (last visited October 27,2003). 
5. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2002). 
6. Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 
CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 115-16 (1985). 
7. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151 B, § 4 (West 2002); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4571 (West 
2001); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West 2001). 
8. See Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977) (as narrowly framed by 
the court, the issue was "whether an employee may be discharged, consistent with Title VII for initiating 
the process of sex transformation"); Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., 1975 WL 302, at * I 
(D.N.J. 1975) (plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII after being discharged from 
her teaching position following sex-reassignment surgery); Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. 
CIVA 78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (plaintiff challenged her discharge 
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harassed, or denied employment for being trans gender, before, during, or after 
transitioning. All of these early attempts to secure workplace protections for 
trans gender people through the courts failed. 
Of the many cases holding that transgender people enjoyed no protection 
under the Act, two typify the hostility of the federal courts towards trans gender 
litigants. The case of Vlane v. Eastern Airlines,9 involved a highly regarded 
commercial pilot terminated by Eastern Airlines upon returning to her job after 
undergoing sex reassignment. The plaintiff argued that since her ability to 
perform her job was unaffected by her transition, the termination had to have 
been the result of the transition itself. JO The Seventh Circuit disagreed. II It freely 
acknowledged the dearth of legislative history to shed light on the intent of 
Congress in enacting the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII I2 and that 
adding "[t]his sex amendment [to the race discrimination prohibition of TitIe VII] 
was the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights 
ACt.,,13 Yet the court nevertheless concluded that Congress must have had "a 
narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act.,,14 Why such a 
conclusion was ineluctable is unclear, especially given the fact that "remedial 
statutes [like the Civil Rights Act] should be liberally construed.,,15 
The reasoning in the second case, Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.,16 is 
equally flawed. 17 Two days after hiring Ms. Sommers for a clerical position, 
Budget learned she was transgender. It immediately terminated her employment, 
ostensibly for "misrepresent[ing] herself as an anatomical female" despite having 
the "anatomical body of a male." 18 How such alleged misrepresentation of Ms. 
Sommers' gender affected her ability to perform her job is unknown. 
Sommers argued that she was terminated because of her "anatomical sex," 
which she conceded was male. 19 While Budget did not dispute the analytical 
soundness of plaintiff's position, it argued it was beside the point because 
transgender people were categorically excluded from coverage under Title VII. 
The Eighth Circuit agreed.20 Like the Seventh Circuit in Ulane, the court 
by the school board on "procedural and substantive due process grounds, as well as on equal protection 
grounds" when she was fired after undergoing sex-reassignment surgery). 
9. 742 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1984). 
10. ld. 
II. /d. at 1087. 
12. See supra note 6. 
13. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines. 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984). 
14. [d. at 1086. Interestingly, the court conjectured that had Congress viewed the Act as protecting 
transgender people from sex discrimination, such a view "would no doubt have sparked an interesting 
debate." [d. at 1085. 
15. [d. at 1086. 
16. Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
17. [d. at 748. 
18. [d. 
19. /d. at 749. 
20. [d. at 749, 750. 
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acknowledged that the legislative history shed little light on Congress's intent 
concerning the scope of sex discrimination prohibitions? I Yet it nevertheless 
concluded that "the major thrust of the 'sex' amendment was towards providing 
equal opportunities for women. ,,22 
As the decisions of the courts of appeal in Ulane and Sommers illustrate, the 
cases holding against trans gender litigants and in favor of discriminatory 
employers are characterized by disturbing, highly problematic, result-oriented 
reasoning?3 In contrast, the arguments advanced by the trans gender plaintiffs 
21. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
22. /d. at 750. 
23. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (finding that "if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was 
not because she is female, but because Ulane is a transsexual" and thus is not protected by Title VII); 
Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 ("Because Congress has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we 
hold that discrimination based on one's transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the 
[Civil Rights] AcC). Ulane and Sommers typify the kind of specious reasoning employed by numerous 
federal courts to reject the claims brought by transgender litigants. See also Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 
(refUsing to extend protection of Title VII to transgender people either as individuals or as a class); 
Grossman v. Bernards Township Brd. of Ed., 1975 WL 302, *4 (September 10, 1975) ("despite the 
plaintiff's conclusory allegations of sex discrimination, it is nevertheless apparent on the basis of the facts 
alleged by the plaintiff that she was discharged by the defendant school board not because of her status as 
a female, but rather because of her change in sex from the male to the female gender"); Voyles v. Ralph K. 
Davies Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("The legislative history of as well as the 
case law interpreting Title VII nowhere indicate that 'sex' discrimination was meant to embrace 
'transsexual' discrimination, or any permutation or combination thereof.... Situations involving 
transsexuals, homosexuals or bisexuals were simply not considered, and from this void the Court is not 
permitted to fashion its own judicial interdictions"); Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.Md. 
1977) ("The gravamen of the Complaint is discrimination against a transsexual and that is precisely what 
is not reached by Title VII"); Terry v. EEOC, 1980 WL 334, *2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980) (Plaintiff, 
transgender employee, filed a complaint with the EEOC when she was not hired as a waitresslhostess by 
Marc's Big Boy Corporation. The EEOC and the Wisconsin Department of Industry dismissed Terry's 
complaint, and she filed suit in federal court alleging discrimination by her prospective employer and 
both agencies. In rejecting her claim, the District Court held that the defendant was free to refuse the 
plaintiff employment precisely because she was trans gender. She was "not being refused employment 
because she is a man or because he is a woman ... Title VII and the constitution do not protect him ... 
[t]he law does not protect males dressed or acting as females and vice versa."); Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & 
Latz, 636 F.2d 1047, 1050, 1051 (5th. Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is no allegation of animus towards 
transsexuals as a class or against the plaintiff as a member of the class. The animus, if any is alleged, is 
directed towards the conduct of the plaintiff in violating the store's dress code, regardless of her 
membership in a class of transsexual persons"); Emanuelle v. United States Tobacco Co., Inc., 1987 WL 
19165, at *2 (N.D. Ill., October 27, 1987) ("Since Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., it has been clear that 
plaintiff's sexual status is not a basis for claiming federally protected rights"); Dobre v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa., 1983) ("The acts of discrimination alleged by the 
plaintiff were not due to stereotypic concepts about a woman's ability to perform ajob nor were they due 
to a condition common to women alone. If the plaintiff was discriminated against at all, it was because 
she was perceived as a male who wanted to become a female"); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 
857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C., 1984) ("The Plaintiff's Complaint gives no indication that any 
discrimination took place on account of her being a woman or a condition associated therewith. Ms. 
Underwood fails to allege any discrimination on the basis of her being a woman, in that she merely 
indicates that she was discriminated against because of her status as a transsexual - that she transformed 
herself into a woman - but alleges no facts regarding discrimination because she is a woman"); Broadus 
v. State Farm Inc., 2000 WL 1585257, at *4 (W.D. Mo., Oct. 11,2000) ("Sexual stereotyping which plays 
a role in an employment decision is actionable under Title VII. It is unclear, however, whether a 
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were cogent, straightforward, and seemingly obvious. It is difficult, analytically, 
to deny that if an employee was considered qualified when known to the 
employer as male and unqualified simply for undergoing medical care and 
treatment to transition to living as female that the root cause of the termination is 
the employee's newly presented sex.24 Despite the argument's simplicity and 
clarity, the courts essentially validated discrimination against trans gender people 
by determining that discrimination due to a change of sex is somehow 
meaningfully distinct from discrimination because ofsex.25 
The courts' findings in these early cases mirrored cultural biases against 
trans gender persons by showing a failure of insight, understanding, or compas­
sion.26 Twisting logic to force negative outcomes, courts concluded that 
trans gender people facing discriminatory treatment in the workplace could not 
have been treated adversely either for being male or female. 27 Rather, they were 
denied protection under the law because courts deemed them neither male nor 
female,28 or, perhaps because they were considered both male and female. The 
emerging judicial consensus seemed to be that trans gender people are a 
transsexual is protected from sex discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII. In Price 
Waterhouse, the plaintiff was not a transsexual"); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc, 2002 WL 
31098541, at *6 (E.D. La., Sept. 16, 2002) ("This is not just a matter of an employee ofone sex exhibiting 
characteristics associated with the opposite sex. This is a matter of a person of one sex assuming the role 
of a person of the opposite sex. After a review of the legislative history of Title VII and the authorities 
interpreting the statute, the Court agrees with Ulane and its progeny that Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex, i.e., biological sex. While Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of sex includes sexual stereotypes, the phrase 'sex' has not been interpreted to include sexual 
identity or gender identity disorders"). 
24. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082-83 (stating plaintiff's argument that Eastern Airlines had no reason to 
discharge Ulane other than sex); see also Ashlie v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12516, at *17 (E.D. Pa., May 9, 1979). (finding that Ashlie "was discharged not on the basis of her status 
as former man, present woman or transsexual, but on the basis of her conduct-in metamorphosing from 
man to woman"). 
25. The illogical nature of this distinction is illustrated by an example offered by Shannon Minter and 
Paisley Currah. "The incoherence of this purportedly meaningful distinction (between sex and change of 
sex) is apparent the moment one imagines a court applying a similar distinction in a case involving 
discrimination on any other ground. It is unlikely, for example, that an employer who terminated an 
employee for changing her religious affiliation or nationality would be absolved of liability on the ground 
that he did not object to the employee's new religion or national origin, but only to the change of religion 
or national origin. Yet, the only difference between these situations and that of a transsexual person is that 
while changing one's religion or nationality is generally considered to be a legitimate personal choice, 
'the very idea that one sex can change into another' is likely to engender 'ridicule and horror.' " Currah & 
Minter, supra note 4, at 41. 
26. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 ("The manifest purpose of Title VII's prohibition against sex 
discrimination in employment is to ensure that men and women are treated equally, absent a bona fide 
relationship between the qualifications for the job and the person's sex"). 
27. The cultural bias in these cases is evidenced by, for example, the courts conjecturing sua sponte 
that employing a transgender person creates difficulties for the employer. For example, the Eighth Circuit 
suggested in Sommers that "Budget faces a problem in protecting the privacy interests of its female 
employees." Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750. Not only was the record devoid of evidence to support such 
assertion, but it was legally irrelevant. 
28. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002) ("The words 'sex,' 'male,' and 
'female' in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals"). 
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"freakish" third sex whose marginalized status, though based on their sex, 
paradoxically could not be protected by a law that prohibits sex discrimination?9 
While some contemporary courts continue to rely on these decisions, the 
general trend, fortunately, has been toward an expanded understanding and 
application of sex discrimination statutes. This change has helped transgender 
people bring successful claims of discrimination in employment and other 
30areas.
The legal climate for transgender claimants improved dramatically in 1989 
when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. 3 ) The plaintiff, a female associate at the accounting firm, was denied 
partnership because, in the words of the partners, she was too "macho," too 
aggressive, did not wear enough make-up, and could use a "course in charm 
school.,,32 In other words, she did not conform to the stereotype of what the 
partners thought a woman should look like or how a woman should act. The 
Supreme Court clarified that sex discrimination laws are intended to strike at a 
broad range of discrimination, including discrimination based on sex stereo­
types.33 In doing so, the Court rejected Price Waterhouse's argument that it had 
not discriminated against Ann Hopkins because she was a woman, but rather 
29. While the district court rejected the contention that Karen Ulane was "freakish," Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 827 (N.D. III., 1983), the Seventh Circuit impliedly embraced it in 
reversing the district court's judgment. U/ane, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
30. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (lst Cir. 2000) (plaintiff, a 
biological male who alleged that he was denied an opportunity to apply for a loan because he was not 
dressed in "masculine attire," may have a valid sex discrimination claim under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, a law construed pursuant to Title VII analysis); Jette v. Honey Farms Mini Market, 2001 
WL 1602799, at *1-2 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Oct. 10,2001) (Massachusetts' disability 
law does not explicitly exclude transgender people from protection discrimination based on disability or 
sex); Millett v. Lutco, 2001 WL 1602800, at *3 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Oct. 10,2001) 
(Massachusetts state law prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex also encompasses discrimination 
against transgender individuals); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 777 A.2d 365, 373-74 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 200 I) ("sex discrimination under the LAD includes gender discrimination so as to 
protect plaintiff from gender stereotyping and discrimination for transforming herself from a man to a 
woman"); Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n on Human Rights & 
Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000) (transgender people protected under Connecticut state laws prohibiting sex 
discrimination) available at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/HearingOffice/HODecisions/ 
declaratoryrulingsIDRDoe.htm; Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6-7(Mass. Super. Ct., Oct. II, 
2000), aff'd sub nom, Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-683 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000) 
(transgender student had viable claim under Massachusetts sex discrimination laws); Rentos v. 
OCE-Office Systems, 1996 WL 737215 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24,1996) ("remedial purpose of the state 
statute was by blanket description to eliminate all forms of discrimination, those then existing as well as 
any later devised") (internal quotations omitted); Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (discrimination based on transgender status violates city ordinance prohibiting 
sex discrimination). 
31. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
32. Id. at 235. 
33. Id. at 251 ("As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated 
with their group"). 
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because she was a woman who failed to look and act like one.34 Subsequent cases 
have applied the same analysis in cases involving male employees who fail to 
conform to masculine stereotypes.35 
Price Waterhouse is significant because it establishes that prohibitions against 
sex discrimination apply to a broader range of discriminatory conduct than the 
stereotypical case of disparate treatment on the basis of biological sex. As a result 
of Price Waterhouse, it is clear today that sex discrimination also means that 
employers cannot discriminate on the basis of characteristics that are usually 
associated with being either masculine or feminine. 
Price Waterhouse has shifted the way courts analyze cases brought by 
transgender litigants. In the last five year, courts and administrative agencies in a 
number of jurisdictions have acknowledged that there is no principled reason to 
exclude trans gender people from coverage under sex discrimination statutes?6 
As a result, trans gender people in some jurisdictions have at least some degree of 
legal protection when employers, public accommodations, lenders, or landlords 
discriminate against them.37 
34. [d. at 256 ("It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive 
female employee as requiring 'a course at charm school' "). 
35. See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (I st Cir.1999) ("[J]ust as a 
woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet 
stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men 
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity") (internal 
citations omitted); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). 
36. See supra, note 28. See. e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 
2000) (plaintiff, a biological male who alleged that he was denied an opportunity to apply for a loan 
because he was not dressed in "masculine attire," may have a valid sex discrimination claim under the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, a law construed pursuant to Title VII analysis); Jette v. Honey Farms Mini 
Market, 2001 WL 1602799, at *1-2 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Oct. 10,2001) (Massachu­
setts' disability law does not explicitly exclude transgender people from protection discrimination based 
on disability or sex); Millett v. Lutco, 2001 WL 1602800, at *3 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination 
Oct. 10,2001) (Massachusetts state law prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex also encompasses 
discrimination against transgender individuals); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 777 A.2d 365, 
373-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("sex discrimination under the LAD includes gender 
discrimination so as to protect plaintiff from gender stereotyping and discrimination for transforming 
herself from a man to a woman"); Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n on 
Human Rights and Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000) (transgender people protected under Connecticut state 
laws prohibiting sex discrimination) available at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapageslHearingOffice! 
HODecisions/deciaratoryrulingsIDRDoe.htm; Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6-7(Mass. Super. 
Ct., Oct. 11,2000), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-683 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 
30,2000) (transgender student had viable claim under Massachusetts sex discrimination laws); Rentos v. 
OCE-Office Systems, 1996 WL 737215 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) ("remedial purpose of the state 
statute was by blanket description to eliminate all forms of discrimination, those then existing as well as 
any later devised") (internal quotations omitted); Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (discrimination based on transsexual status violates city ordinance prohibiting 
sex discrimination). 
37. Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (In 
employment context, court held "The word 'sex' as used in the LAD should be interpreted to include 
gender, protecting from discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. ... We conclude that sex 
discrimination under the LAD includes gender discrimination so as to protect plaintiff from gender 
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Judges and human rights commissioners were not convinced to follow the 
Price Waterhouse reasoning in extending the laws' protections to transgender 
people simply as a result of clever lawyering. Based on my own experiences 
litigating cases in Connecticut and Massachusetts courts and administrative 
agencies, and working on legislation in Rhode Island, I believe that the work of 
medical professionals in educating the public about transsexualism, gender 
identity disorder, and transgender people has contributed immensely to changing 
and opening the minds of judges, along with other members of the legal and 
political communities. 
Looking at dicta from a recent case and a human rights commission decision 
with favorable outcomes for transgender litigants proves this point. For example, 
in New Jersey, a trans gender doctor brought a claim analogous to the one brought 
by Karen Ulane eighteen years before.38 Rather than discussing the case as not 
being rooted in sex discrimination as in Ulane, the Enriquez court saw a legal 
connection earlier courts had ignored.39 While it is difficult to conjecture the 
reason for the Enriquez court's departure from the earlier analyses, it is fair to 
assume that the submission of medical testimony related to the plaintiff's 
condition humanized her in the eyes of the court. Although not essential to the 
analysis, the judge noted the medical etiology of the plaintiff's condition and 
included medical facts in some detail. As the court explained, 
Gender dysphoria is regarded medically as a 'mental disorder occur­
ring in an estimated frequency of 1 :50,000 individuals.' Cole, Emory, 
Huang, Meyer, Treatment of Gender Dysphoria, 90 Tex. Med. 68 
(1994). Moreover, treatment for the disorder can now 'be regarded as 
accepted medical practice.' The disorder is recognized within DSM-IV, 
thus confirming that the condition can be diagnosed by accepted 
clinical techniques. In fact, the DSM-IV lists four criteria necessary for 
diagnosing a gender identity disorder.4o 
Similarly, in Connecticut a recent request for declaratory ruling asked whether 
the existing state sex discrimination law covers transgender litigants.41 The 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") 
answered in the affirmative. Here again, while not essential to the legal analysis, 
the Commission referred to medical information pertaining to trans gender people 
stereotyping and discrimination for transforming herself from a man to a woman."); Rosa, 214 F.3d at 
215 (lender may not discriminate on basis of sex stereotyping under Equal Credit Opportunity Act). 
38. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 365. 
39. See Id. (The court held in Enriquez that sex discrimination statute should be liberally construed 
and that discrimination on the basis of sex may include gender discrimination). 
40. See /d. at 519-520. 
41. Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n on Human Rights and 
Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000) available at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapageslHearingOffice/ 
HODecisions/declaratoryrulingsIDRDoe.htm. (last visited Sep. 26, 2003). 
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in support of its ruling. As the CHRO explained, "[t]ranssexual individuals are 
classified by the medical profession as those individuals who have gender 
identity conflict, gender dysphoria, and/or gender identity disorder."42 Further, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has defined a transsexual [as], one who has "[a] rare 
psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his 
or her anatomical sex," and who typically seeks medical treatment, including 
hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change. Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (quoting American Medical Association, 
Encyclopedia ofMedicine 1006 (1989)).43 
As these examples illustrate, medical professionals have humanized transgen­
der people in the eyes of judges and in doing so have explained why 
discrimination against transgender people is wrong. This educational work has 
gone a long way in dissuading judges and other policy makers of the notion that 
transgender people are a freakish third sex unworthy of legal protections.44 
Medical professionals' ability to explain the medical necessity for surgery and 
hormone therapy for some trans gender people4s has validated the condition and 
established an accepted standard of care. Framing the plight of transgender 
42. See generally The Standards of Care for Identity Disorders (Fifth version, June 15, 1998), Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (Doe Petition, Exhibit C. See also American 
Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders (Fourth Edition, 1994) 
(HDSM-IV"). 
43. See supra note 41. Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000) available at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapageslHearingOffice/ 
HODecisions/deciaratoryrulingsIDRDoe.htm. (last visited Sep. 26, 2003). 
44. Educational work on the part of medical professionals has also been helpful in humanizing 
transgender persons litigating in other non-employment contexts. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. 
Supp. 2d 736, 769-70 (N.D. Iowa, 1999), rev'd, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001) (H[T]here are appropriate 
screening standards adhered to by the subspecialty of practitioners devoted to treating gender identity 
disorder, the Harry Benjamin Standards. Although sex reassignment surgery may be relatively unknown, 
at least outside of the community of professionals actively involved in treatment of gender identity 
disorder, there is sufficient 'authoritative evidence' that sex reassignment surgery is both safe and 
effective as a treatment for extreme cases of gender identity disorder which do not respond to 
psychotherapy or other treatment."); see also Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 
2002) (recognizing that Kosilek suffers "from a severe form of a rare, medically recognized, major 
mental illness-gender identity disorder ... [which] has caused Kosilek to suffer constant mental 
anguish"). A rigorous analysis of the state of the law for trans gender litigants in the areas of health care 
and prisons is beyond the scope of this essay. 
45. HIn persons diagnosed with transsexualism or profound GID, sex reassignment surgery, along with 
hormone therapy and real-life experience, is a treatment that has proven to be effective. Such a 
therapeutic regimen, when prescribed or recommended by qualified practitioners is medically indicated 
and medically necessary. Sex reassignment is not 'experimental,' 'investigational,' 'elective,' 'cosmetic,' 
or optional in any meaningful sense. It constitutes very effective and appropriate treatment for 
transsexualism or profound GID." HBIGDA Standards of Care, at http://www.hbigda.orglsocv6sm.pdf 
(last visited October 27, 2003), see also FRIEDEMANN PFAFFLIN, ASTRID JUNGE, SEX REASSIGNMENT. 
THIRTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL FOLLOW-UP STUDIES AFTER SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY: A COMPRE­
HENSIVE REVIEW, 1961-1991 available at http://www.symposion.comlijtlpfaefflinl6003.htm (Last visited 
October 27,2003) (follow-up surveys of post-operative transsexuals showed that H[t]he most important 
effect in the patients' opinion was the lessening of suffering with the added increase of subjective 
satisfaction"). 
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people in this context has helped humanize them in the eyes of the court and has 
contributed to debunking the myth that they are "freakish." 
The changes in both law and mind set have enabled human rights commissions 
to begin educating employers about how to treat transgender people with 
fairness, dignity and respect. Medical professionals have been and continue to be 
integral in this educational work, all of which is good news for trans gender 
people and for society generally, as we all benefit when an individual's potential 
is not limited by discrimination. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
While trans gender litigants have made substantial progress in the area of 
employment non-discrimination law as courts increasingly reject the notion that 
trans gender people are a freakish third sex; the news is not nearly so positive in 
the arena of family law. These family law decisions, fueled by the same prejudice 
initially encountered in employment non-discrimination cases, threaten to 
reverse the positive gains in the employment context. Hopefully, we can learn 
from the historical developments there and take affirmative steps early, including 
incorporating medical testimony in family law cases, in order to avoid spending 
the next thirty years working to reverse harmful family law precedents. 
In two recent decisions, state courts in both Kansas and Texas invalidated the 
marriages of trans gender people solely because one of the partners was 
transgender.46 Several older cases jeopardize healthy and important relationships 
between transgender parents and their children.47 In the custody context, the 
Nevada Supreme Court upheld the termination of a transgender parent's parental 
rights solely based on the parent's transgender status.48 A Minnesota appellate 
court granted custody to a transgender parent contingent upon the parent's 
agreement to hide the fact that she was transgender.49 In 1997, a state appeals 
court in Missouri reversed an order that awarded joint legal, not even physical, 
custody to a male-to-female transgender parent and imposed an indefinite 
moratorium on visitation.50 The court based its decision on an unsupported 
46. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 122 (Kan. 2002) (the court concluded that the 
marriage between a man and a transgender woman was void under Kansas law); Littleton v. Prange, 9 
S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (the court reached the same conclusion under Texas law). 
47. See Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 70-71 (Nev. 1986) (in terminating transgender father's parental 
rights, the court stated that the decision to transition was his "choice" and that he is a "person whose own 
needs, desires and wishes were paramount and were indulged without regard to their impact on the life 
and psyche of the daughter."); J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.w.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (the appellate 
court reversed trial court decision to grant joint legal custody and suspended father's visitation rights 
indefinitely based on the conclusion that seeing their father as a woman would be "emotionally 
confusing" and "impair the boys' emotional development."); See also In re Custody of T.J., 1988 WL 
8302, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988) (the court granted custody to father in spite of his "gender 
dysphoria" only where he was undergoing therapy and decided to "maintain his male gender"). 
48. Daly, 715 P.2d at 70-71. 
49. Custody ofT.i., 1988 WL 8302, at *3. 
50. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d at 772. 
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conclusion infused with bias that, for the children, seeing their father as a woman 
would be "emotionally confusing.,,51 Neither social science nor legal doctrine 
dictated that ruling. The impetus for the decision was pure judicial prejudice and 
resulted in the court's complete disregard for the traditional best-interests-of-the­
child analysis that governs decisions in custody cases. 
The right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the United States 
Constitution.52 Nevertheless, courts have invalidated transgender peoples' mar­
riages with little or no legal analysis. Consider, for example, the case of Littleton 
that involved the validity of the 1989 marriage of, Christie Lee Littleton, a 
male-to-female transgender woman, to Jonathan Mark Littleton, a biological 
male.53 The marriage took place nearly ten years after Christie Lee transitioned,54 
a fact known by her husband.55 Seven years into their marriage, Jonathan died, 
allegedly due to medical malpractice. 56 Christie Lee brought a wrongful death 
claim, a right enjoyed by all legal spouses. 57 Rather than challenge the case on its 
merits, the defendant contested the lawfulness of Christie's marriage.58 Finding 
the marriage invalid, the Texas Appellate Court ignored the medical and factual 
reality that Christie Lee was a woman, having taken hormones and having 
undergone sex-reassignment,59 and ruled instead that she was a man. In the 
absence of live medical testimony, the court inaccurately concluded, "[s]ome 
physicians would consider Christie a female; other physicians would consider her 
still a male.,,6Q Relying on metaphysics over science, the court stated, "there are 
many fine metaphysical arguments lurking about here involving desire and being, 
the essence of life and the power of mind over physics,,,61 and determined that it 
must not "wander too far into the misty fields of sociological philosophy.,,62 
"Some things," said the court, "we cannot will into being. They just are.,,63 
Apparently relying on its own understanding of science, the court concluded that 
because Christie had the chromosomes of a man-a fact never even entered as 
evidence before the Court-her marriage to Jonathan was one between two 
people of the same sex.64 Because Texas law outlaws marriages between people 
51. Id. 
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' 
fundamental to our very existence and survival"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("right 
to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals"). 
53. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999). 





59. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31. 
60. /d. at 224. 
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of the same sex, the court ruled the marriage invalid, and on that basis denied her 
wrongful death claim. 
Unfortunately, the damaging effect of Littleton has spread beyond Texas.65 In a 
similar case brought in Kansas, the estranged son of Marshall Gardiner 
challenged the right of a transgender woman, J'Noel Gardiner, to her share of the 
decedent's estate as his widow.66 The lower court adopted wholesale the Littleton 
court's reasoning and determined "some physicians would consider J'Noel a 
female; other physicians would consider her still a male. Her female anatomy, 
however, is still all man-made. The body J'Noel inhabits is a male body in all 
aspects other than what the physicians have supplied .... From that the Court has 
to conclude, and from the evidence that's been submitted under the affidavits, as a 
matter of law, she-J'Noel is a male.,,67 The Kansas intermediate appellate court, 
detailing the medical and factual information the lower court should consider in 
determining J'Noel's legal sex, reversed and remanded.68 In doing so it 
"reject[ed] the reasoning of the majority in the Littleton case as a rigid and 
simplistic approach to issues that are far more complex than addressed in that 
opinion.,,69 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed.70 In arguably more draconian 
language than that used by the Texas Appeals Court in Littleton, the Kansas 
Supreme Court called into question the very ability of trans gender people to 
marry at all. The Court stated that "a marriage is the legal status, condition, or 
relation of one man and one woman (internal citation ornitted).,,71 The Court 
noted that" 'male' and 'female' in everyday understanding do not encompass 
transsexuals. ,,n As a result, the right of a trans gender person to marry at all in 
Kansas is tenuous at best. 
There have, however, been some favorable decisions in the family law context. 
In Orange County California, petitioner Kristie Vecchione sought to annul her 
marriage to her husband, Joshua Vecchione, claiming that Joshua was not a man 
because he is transgender.73 Thus, she concluded theirs was a "same-sex" 
65. This decision generally follows the reasoning of a case originating from the United Kingdom, 
considered to be foundational in this area of the law. See Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.1970) 
66. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 123. 
67. In re Estate of Gardiner, Estate No. 9908 PE 00119, slip op. at 7-9 (Dis!. C!. Kan. Jan. 21, 2000). 
68. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. App. 200 1). While the intermediate appellate 
court's decision was fairer than in Littleton and was hailed by some transgender advocates, the off 
reasoning was troubling nonetheless. The appeals court said that there should be a case-by-case 
determination of a transgender person's sex based on medical and non-medical evidence but did not 
establish standards for determining who is male and who is female, or how the court should weigh the 
evidence in any given case. Id. Thus, even if the court's decision had stood, its reasoning leaves 
trans gender people in a legal netherworld in which courts are left to make ad hoc determinations about 
the lawfulness of a marriage based on the specific facts and circumstances of the individual case. 
69. Id. at 1110. 
70. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135. 
71. Id. at 135. 
72. rd. 
73. In re Marriage of: Kristie Vecchione & Joshua Vecchione, No. 96D003769 Slip Op. at 2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. October 22, 1998). 
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marriage and not recognized under the law.74 Kristie used this claim, in turn, to 
contend that Joshua was not the father of their child, Briana, who was conceived 
through alternative insemination during their marriage.75 The court disagreed, 
stating that "Joshua Vecchione, who the court finds was born a female and has 
gone through the trans gender surgery, is for all marital purposes a male and the 
nullity requested based on same-sex marriage is denied."76 As a consequence of 
that finding, the judge declared that the "child born as the result of artificial 
insemination in a marriage context is the child of that marriage and is the child of 
the husband and wife.,,77 Thus, "Joshua Vecchione is the father of Briana.,,7S 
In Florida, a trial court granted a trans gender parent, Michael Kantaras, 
primary residential custody of his two children 79 after his wife of ten years 
challenged the validity of their marriage in an attempt to strip him of his parental 
rights.so In order to resolve the question of whether the marriage was valid, the 
judge took on the task of determining "what is a man and what is a woman."Sl 
Unlike the judge in Gardiner and Littleton, the judge in Kantaras deferred to 
expert testimony of medical professionals in making his decision, acknowledging 
that "Drs. Bockting, Huang, Cole, and Dies contributed significantly to the 
outcome of this case."S2 The medical complexity of the determination extended 
far beyond dictionary definitions of "sex."S3 "[B]ased on the testimony of 
medical experts, Drs. Bockting, Huang and Cole in this case," the trial court 
concluded that Michael's sex was indeed "male.,,84 The finding of marital 
validity was important not only to Michael's parental rights but also in 
determining the best interest of the children. ''These children have had the 
benefits and protection that the law provides to married parents. [They] have a 
legally sanctioned family with all the law's benefits and privileges .. .If the 
marriage of their parents is declared 'invalid' ab initio, these children will have 
lost what the marriage statute of Florida was intended to provide, especially, the 
'right of support.' ,,85 "These consequences [of invalidating the marriage] are 
deplorable. The consequences of 'divorce' is [sic] bad enough as a 'fall out' on 
the children, without hindering their rightful development into adulthood by 
having their birth legitimacy put in question. These children are innocent and 
have been intentionally drawn into this adult conflict over transsexualism which a 
74. [d. at 2. 
75. [d. at 3. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at 3. 
78. [d. 
79. [n re The Marriage of Michael 1. Kantaras and Linda Kantaras, Reporter at 808 (2003). 
80. [d. at 132. 
81. [d. at 708. 
82. [d. at 767. 
83. [d. at 709. ("[Iln the opinion of this Court, the battle of the dictionaries is not an adequate 
substitute for medical knowledge"). 
84. [d. at 771. 
85. [d. at 772. 
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narrow and rigid interpretation of the Florida marriage statute can lead to 
calamitous results for these children.,,86 
In order to influence the course of future cases addressing the validity of 
trans gender marriages, one should consider the issues, both cultural and legal, 
that drive outcomes like Littleton and Gardiner. The first factor, of course, is 
homophobia.S? In every state in this country and in nearly every country in the 
world--except the Netherlands, Belgium, and, most recently, Canada-gay and 
lesbian couples are prevented from marrying.88 In other words, to be a marriage, 
the two spouses must include one man and one woman. Even in Vermont, where 
the highest court agreed that denying gay and lesbian couples the right to marry 
violated principles of equality guaranteed by the state constitution,89 there is a 
legal marital status that is distinct from marriage for same-sex couples.90 
Although civil unions provide virtually all of the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, they do not grant equal access to marriage. And, in the wake of the 
Vermont case, the state legislature was not particularly concerned with the 
outcome for trans gender people in the adoption of the civil union law. For 
example, the resulting civil union law allows only same-sex couples to enter into 
that newly minted status.91 The civil union law does not answer the question for 
transgender people about who we may marry. In contrast, the Netherlands law 
allows any two adults to marry regardless of sex, which is perhaps the only 
certain way to protect the marriages of transgender people. Unfortunately, no 
state in this country to date has allowed couples to marry regardless of the sex of 
the spouses.92 
The second factor behind outcomes like Littleton and Gardiner is that many 
family law courts remain driven by the notion that transgender people are a 
freakish third sex who do not deserve protection when cases concerning marriage 
and rights and responsibilities relating to children arise. The fact that the family 
law arena involves emotionally and culturally charged matters about children and 
procreation only highlights this thread of prejudice and misunderstanding. It is 
86. ld. at 773. 
87. The homophobic motivation behind numerous cases involving transgender litigants has been 
addressed at length in other works. See generally e.g., ANDREW SHARPE TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE 
(2001). 
88. As of April 2001, the Netherlands allows same-sex couples to marry. The Dutch law eliminated all 
references to gender in laws covering marriage and adoption and amended the dictionary to remove 
references to "man and woman" in the definition of marriage. 
89. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
90. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1200 (2002). 
91. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1202 (2002) ("For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be 
necessary that the parties to a civil union ... [b]e of the same sex and therefore excluded from the 
marriage laws of this state."). 
92. Two pending cases, one in Massachusetts and one in New Jersey, offer hope for equality in 
marriage for all couples. Granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples, could ensure that all marriages 
entered into by transgender individuals are legally respected. Goodridge et al. v. Department of Public 
Health et ai., 2002 WL 1299135 (Mass., May 7, 2002); and Lewis et al. v. Harris et aI., No. L-425502 
(New Jersey). 
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thus in the context of family law cases that the testimony of medical professionals 
can be most helpful. 
Illustrative of this point, the Kantaras judge himself opined on the value of live 
medical testimony in rejecting the findings in Gardiner that trans gender people 
do not fit the definition of their transitioned sex because the definitions proffered 
were "strictly legal rather than medical.,,93 "Any challenge to [dictionary 
definitions], if there be one, based on medical science must be convincingly 
presented in the record ... [and] has to be based on sound medical evidence.,,94 
The Court criticized Littleton for the absence of "live testimony in court by these 
two doctors.,,95 "These doctors did not testify in court at all. They were not 
subject to questioning about how they arrived at their conclusions or subject to 
cross-examination. All their testimony was 'proposed' and submitted only in 
proposal form in 'affidavits,' attached to the response to a motion for summary 
judgment. ... The Gardiner case suffers from the same record deficiency.,,96 
Moreover, in determining Michael's sex, the Kantaras judge emphasized the 
importance of medical testimony: "That is where the medical community comes 
to the aid of the Court .... He may be a transsexual man as an additional feature 
of his heterosexual makeup, but nevertheless, medical science declares him to be 
a man. The law has no basis in medical fact to reclassify what science declares. 
There is no authority given the courts to practice medicine. And, least of all, the 
subjective bias of a judge is not to be disguised as legislative intent.,m 
Several recent cases highlight the struggle courts are grappling with in the 
family law area when facing the question of what steps an individual must take to 
transition for legal purposes from one sex to another. In some instances, medical 
testimony has been a critically important means of educating the court about 
trans gender people. While not necessary (or possibly even helpful in some cases), 
medical professionals can play an instrumental role in ensuring that children's 
relationships with parents are protected despite cultural biases and lack of 
understanding about transgender people's lives. 
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Legal and medical professionals can play a critical role in supporting and 
encouraging positive outcomes in family law cases involving transgender people. 
Until marriage is available to everyone, we should seek to secure a legal rule that 
reflects the emerging medical consensus among experts in the field. In addition, 
medical experts can help to develop empathy in the greater community toward 
transgender litigants and, more specifically, help individual litigants to secure 
93. Kantaras at 725. 
94. /d. at 769-70. 
95. Id. at 767. 
96. Id. at 768. 
97. /d. at 708. 
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rights by chipping away at deeply held cultural prejudices that do not reflect 
medical realities. 
When people who identify and are living as members of their new gender have 
undergone whatever medical treatments are determined necessary for that person, 
the law should recognize the person's reassigned sex for all purposes, including 
marriage, custody, divorce, and any other family-law related matters. While this 
may seem obvious insofar as it simply reflects the emerging medical consensus, 
the road ahead will not be smooth. The participation of medical professionals in 
working to achieve this result is critical to secure legal successes as well as 
humanity, dignity, and basic civil rights for trans gender people. 
In addition to endorsing a legal rule based in medical reality, there are several 
specific ways in which medical professionals can play key roles in this legal 
work: professionals who specialize in working with trans gender clients can work 
more diligently to increase awareness in the courts as well as among others in the 
medical community about contemporary medical knowledge and practices 
regarding trans gender people. This includes educating others about the differ­
ences among transgender people and the need for a flexible, individualized 
approach to medical treatment, an approach endorsed by the HBIGDA Standards 
of Care. 
It would also be particularly helpful for specialists to educate others about 
some of the most common differences in the treatments provided to transgender 
men and women as well as debunking some of the more popular myths. For 
example, while a significant percentage of transgender women have genital 
reconstructive surgery, the great majority of transgender men do not. The reasons 
for this include the medical limitations in developing an effective prosthesis, 
some of the long-term complications from the surgery, and the expense, which 
puts it out of reach for most people, particularly in light of its general exclusion 
from insurance coverage. 
Another common misconception that medical providers can address to the 
courts and medical community is that all trans gender people fit the classic 
description of being trapped in the "wrong body." While this description rings 
true for some trans gender people, others have a different and more complex 
experience. Similarly, many people mistakenly believe that all trans gender 
people feel compelled to undergo hormone treatment and genital surgery. Again, 
while this is true for some trans gender people, it is not true for all. Determining 
which steps are medically appropriate and necessary for any given person 
requires an individualized inquiry.98 For some people, the appropriate steps 
98. "[T]he diagnosis of GID invites the consideration of a variety of therapeutic options, only one of 
which is the complete therapeutic triad [of hormones, therapy, and sex reassignment surgery]. Clinicians 
have become aware that not all persons with gender identity disorders need or want all three elements of 
triadic therapy." The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care 
for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version (February 2001) available at http://www.hbigda.orgl 
soc.html. 
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include only hormone therapy. For others, it includes surgery. For many 
female-to-male transsexuals, phalloplasty, or the surgical construction of a 
phallus, is not considered medically necessary, particularly given some of the 
limitations of the surgery complications and associated riskS.99 Non-surgical 
options, such as hormone therapy, are also increasingly the choice for some 
male-to-female transsexuals as well. 
It is important to provide policy makers, including the legal community and 
government agencies that deal with these questions, with a broader conception of 
what constitutes sex-reassignment. Medical professionals can do much to dispel 
the myth that the process of sex-reassignment consists of a single operation. 
Sex-reassignment is an individualized process that generally involves hormone 
therapy, the real-life experience (living full-time in one's appropriate gender), 
and if determined to be medically necessary for a particular individual, one or 
more of several different kinds of sex-reassignment surgery. 100 No single surgery 
or treatment is necessary in every case. The established medical view concludes 
otherwise. 
Determining whether someone has undergone what some laws refer to as 
"sex-reassignment, so called,,,101 is a more complicated question than whether 
someone has had a phalloplasty or a vaginoplasty. Unbeknownst to many judges, 
there are a range of surgeries available to individuals based on their medical 
condition, including hysterectomy, orchiectomy, bilateral mastectomy, metaoid­
ioplasty, and others. Sex-reassignment and transitioning includes identifying and 
living as the other gender as well as hormonal therapy. The appropriate treatment 
is based on individual assessment. 102 No single procedure is necessary in every 
case. 
There also needs to be a broader understanding that there is no hierarchy of 
99. See In Re The Marriage of Kantaras v. Kantaras, 320-339 (Testimony of Dr. Ted Huang). 
100. See The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care for 
Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version (February 2001) available at http://www.hbigda.orglsoc.html 
(last visited on October 28,2003) ("The SOC provide for an individual approach for every patient; but 
this does not mean that the general guidelines, which specify treatment consisting of diagnostic 
evaluation, possible psychotherapy, hormones, and real-life experience, can be ignored. However, if a 
person has lived convincingly as a member of the preferred gender for a long period of time and is 
assessed to be a psychologically healthy after a requisite period of psychotherapy, there is no inherent 
reason that he or she must take hormones prior to genital surgery"). 
101. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 46, § l3e (West 2002) ("If a person has completed sex reassignment 
surgery, so-called, and has had his name legally changed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the birth 
record of said person shall be amended to reflect the newly acquired sex and name, provided that an 
affidavit is received by the town clerk, executed by the person to whom the record relates, and 
accompanied by a physician's notarized statement that the person named on the birth record has 
completed sex reassignment surgery, so-caJled, and is not of the sex recorded on said record. Said 
affidavit shall also be accompanied by a certified copy of the legal change of name aforementioned 
above"). 
102. See The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care for 
Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version (February 2001) available at http://www.hbigda.orglsoc.html 
(last visited at October 28,2003). 
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treatment. A person who has multiple surgeries and is on hormones is no more 
"fully transitioned" than a person who is living as the other gender and has 
experienced the profound physical changes that result from hormone therapy. As 
more states permit transgender people to change their birth certificates (as 
Connecticut recently did),I03 this issue becomes increasingly significant with 
respect to transgender people's marriages. 
Litigants need medical professionals' help in the courts to support arguments 
that transgender people are emotionally stable and are good parents applying the 
same criteria used to evaluate non-transgender people. No categorical reason 
based on a diagnosis of GID or gender dysphoria exists to deny trans gender 
people continued contact with their children, including physical custody. 104 This 
role is critical because of the characterization of transgenderism as a psychiatric 
disorder. Even acknowledging differences of opinion within the leading medical 
professional organization, the Harry Benjamin Gender Dysphoria Association 
(HBIGDA), regarding the origin of the cQndition that transgender people 
experience, there is no disagreement about its legitimacy or medical reality. 
Regardless of where one stands on this issue, whether transsexualism is properly 
characterized as a mental health or physical condition, there is no reason to 
believe that being transgender renders a person unstable or unfit to care for 
children. 
Finally, medical professionals should not hesitate to confirm that a person who 
identifies and is living as a member of his/her reassigned sex, and who has 
undergone all of the medically necessary steps for that individual to transition 
from one sex to another, should be considered a member of the reassigned sex for 
all purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
As our movement for civil rights gains momentum, there will be setbacks as 
well as advances for trans gender people. The more that courts and others 
involved in the legal world know about the reality of transgender people's lives, 
the better the outcomes will be. In particular, the role of medical professionals 
may be key in many cases, particularly where they can explain an individual's 
condition and the ways it relates (or does not relate) to the legal question at issue 
in the case. 
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104. See Richard Green, M.D., Transsexuals' Children, 2 The International Journal of Transgenderism 
4 (Oct.- Dec. 1998) available at http://www.symposion.comlijtlijtc0601.htm ("Available evidence does 
not support concerns that a parent's transsexualism directly adversely impacts on the children. By 
contrast, there is extensive clinical experience showing the detriment to children in consequence of 
terminated contact with a parent after divorce. The cases described here and twenty years earlier 
demonstrate that transsexual parents can remain effective parents and that children can understand and 
empathize with their transsexual parent. The cases demonstrate that gender identity confusion does not 
occur and that any teasing is no more a problem than the teasing children get for a myriad of reasons"); 
Richard Green, M.D., Sexual Identity of37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents 135 
Amer. J. Psychiatry 692 (1978). 
